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Abstract 
The querelle des femmes was an intellectual debate over the status of women that occurred in the early 
modern period, between the 1400s and 1700s. A common argument for the superiority of men and 
inferiority of women that appeared during the debate is that women are less physically strong than men, and 
are therefore inferior. In response, two distinct argumentative strategies were developed by defenders of 
women. First, some argued that men and women did not in fact differ in physical strength. A second strategy 
was to deny that physical strength is relevant to the question of superiority. In this case, one would argue 
that a difference in strength is not normatively relevant to evaluations of worth. I argue that this second 
strategy was the more effective response to the argument that women were inferior because of their alleged 
physical weakness compared to men. 
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1. Introduction 
The querelle des femmes concerned the status of women, 
and particularly whether they are equal, inferior, or 
superior to men. A common argument for the superiority 
of men and inferiority of women that appeared during the 
querelle is the claim that women are less physically strong 
than men, and are therefore inferior. In response, two 
distinct argumentative strategies were developed by 
defenders of women. First, some argued that men and 
women did not in fact differ with respect to the quality in 
question, in this case physical strength. The sophisticated 
variants of this argument suggest that there is no 
necessary difference between the strength of men and 
women, though there can exist a contingent difference in 
strength based on the circumstances under which women 
live. A second argumentative strategy was to deny that the 
quality in dispute is relevant to the question of superiority. 
In this case, one would argue that any difference in 
physical strength does not matter when evaluating the 
comparative worth of the sexes. This second approach 
relies on a conception of moral relevance. An assessment 
of the comparative worth of the sexes is a normative 
evaluation, so only qualities which matter for normative 
evaluations are relevant to this assessment of worth. If 
physical strength is not a normatively relevant quality, one 
can dismiss any difference in physical strength between 
men and women as irrelevant to the dispute over the 
relative worth of the sexes. In what follows, I argue that 
the second strategy was the more effective counter to the 
misogynistic argument that women were inferior because 
of their alleged physical weakness compared to men. 
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2. Two Argumentative Strategies 
  
 The querelle des femmes refers to an intellectual 
debate which occurred in the early modern period, 
between the 1400s and 1700s. The debate concerned 
the status of women, with misogynist texts on one side 
purporting to demonstrate the inferiority of women, while 
advocates for women argued for their equality or 
superiority. In Medieval Europe, the prevailing 
philosophical views on women were developed by clerics 
working at universities and writing in Latin (King & Rabil 
xii), though the vernacular literary tradition also discussed 
the nature of women and their role in society. This 
tradition was “infused with misogyny” and it “portrayed 
most women as lustful or deceitful, while praising good 
housekeepers and loyal wives … or the female saints and 
martyrs” (Ibid.). In the late fourteenth century, certain 
prominent misogynist works provoked the querelle des 
femmes. The translation of Matheolus’ Lamentations into 
French led Christine de Pizan to write a rebuttal, the Book 
of the City of Ladies. Likewise, Giovanni Boccaccio’s Il 
Corbaccio, published in 1355, was a prominent 
misogynist manifesto. During the querelle, various works 
defending or exalting women responded either to the 
general negative attitude toward women, or were direct 
refutations of misogynistic screeds. Examples include 
Pizan’s response to Matheolus, or Lucrezia Marinella’s 
The Nobility and Excellence of Women, written in reply to 
Giuseppe Passi’s The Defects of Women. 
 During the Renaissance interest was renewed in 
classical philosophy, particularly Plato and Aristotle. 
Plato’s claim in the Republic that women are capable of 
doing philosophy and equally entitled to rule was often 
cited by advocates for women (Equicola 11; Tarabotti 101; 
Gournay 56). However, Aristotle’s remarks on sexual 
differentiation were less amenable to women. According 
to the Generation of Animals, women are less hot than 
men, and this lack of heat makes them less physically and 
intellectually capable (775a5-15). More to the present 
point, the Economics states: “Nature has made one sex 
stronger, the other weaker…” (1343b29-30). Although the 
Economics is recognized today as not an authentic work of 
Aristotle, likely having been written by his student, it was 
accepted as Aristotle’s in the early modern period. On the 
basis of men’s greater physical strength, the Economics 
confines women to watching over the home while men 
pursue “active occupations” outside of the domestic 
sphere (1344a1-5). In fairness, the roles assigned to men 
and women are meant to be complementary, and men are 
told to honour their wives (Marinella 137). However, the 
activities associated with the highest human virtues found 
in the Aristotelian corpus, like study (Nicomachean Ethics 
1177a20), are allotted to men, so the virtues proper to 
women are subordinate. The misogynist writers in the 
querelle often followed pseudo-Aristotle in arguing that 
women’s lack of physical strength evidenced their 
inferiority, and that it makes their subordination to men 
natural (Marinella 136). Those advocating for women 
naturally contested this conclusion. 
 The querelle des femmes thus consisted on one 
side of claims men were superior to women, and on the 
other side the claims that women were equal or superior 
to men. This raises the question: what does it mean to 
claim one sex is superior to the other? A claim of this sort, 
at its most general, is the claim that one or the other sex 
has a given quality to a greater or lesser extent then the 
other. A non-exhaustive list of qualities participants to the 
querelle purport one or the other sex to have in a greater 
abundance include such things as intelligence, virtue, 
nobility, constancy, or strength. When faced with this kind 
of claim to superiority—for instance, the claims in 
misogynist texts that men are physically stronger, and 
therefore superior—there are two possible strategies for 
rebuttal. Firstly, one can simply deny that women possess 
less of the quality in dispute, in this case strength. There 
is a myriad of ways to motivate this argument, like noting 
the variances in strength between men (Castiglione 214), 
or pointing to historical examples of physically strong 
women (Pizan 53). Sophisticated variants of this response 
often concede that women possess less of a disputed 
quality, like strength, but argue the difference is not a 
necessary feature of their sex but a contingent result of 
their circumstances. The purported weakness of women is 
explained in terms of lack of exercise. 
 A second argumentative strategy is to not deny 
that men and women differ with respect to a particular 
quality, but to argue the quality in question is irrelevant to 
their respective worth. This approach allows one to 
concede the existence of a difference between the sexes, 
but assert that this difference does not matter, and thus 
cannot be used to designate one or the other sex as 
superior. Consider, for instance, physical strength. A writer 
adopting this strategy can concede that men are typically 
physically stronger than women, but deny that this marks 
them as superior, since physical strength is not a quality 
the possession of which makes a person better than 
another. The nature of this argument is negative, in that it 
involves eliminating from discussion qualities that might 
differ between the sexes which are irrelevant to the 
question of their respective worth. Accordingly, this 
argumentative strategy cannot by itself be used to make a 
case that one or the other sex is superior, because it only 
removes some quality from consideration. However, upon 
designating the qualities which are irrelevant, authors 
usually go on to identify which qualities are relevant to 
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consideration of who or what is superior. Necessary to this 
argumentative strategy of distinguishing between the 
qualities that are relevant and irrelevant to assessments 
of worth is a conception of moral relevance. Moral 
relevance refers to the status of being relevant to 
normative evaluations. Evaluations of the comparative 
worth of the sexes are a kind of normative evaluation, so if 
some consideration lacks general moral relevance, it will 
be irrelevant to the specific question of which sex is 
superior. Clearly, not just any difference between two 
people is morally relevant to assessments of whether one 
is better than the other. If I claimed that Bob was superior 
to Margaret because Bob possesses more freckles, then 
those listening would likely object that this is not a morally 
relevant difference. The objection is motivated by an 
intuitive understanding that whatever principles exist that 
should inform our moral judgments, the number of 
freckles one has is not one of them. Disputes over the 
moral relevance of a property are in this way ethical 
controversies and “to advocate the relevance of a given 
fact is to subscribe to an ethical principle” (Emmons 228). 
When advocates of women in the querelle reject physical 
strength as relevant to comparative evaluations of worth 
they are in fact asserting, often implicitly, that there is 
some set of ethical principles by which it is appropriate to 
judge people, and physical strength is not one of them. As 
an argumentative strategy, this is powerful since it 
eliminates the need to quibble over whether women are in 
fact as strong as men. 
3. Arguments  Against Difference 
    Early in the querelle, defenders of women would 
respond to suggestions that women were physically 
weaker than men by rejecting the claim as 
straightforwardly false. As the question is empirical, 
one common method of responding to it was to point 
to purportedly empirical examples. Authors writing in 
the early modern period, including those involved in 
the querelle, did not draw strict distinctions between 
history and mythology for the sake of argumentation. 
Consequently, the examples used to illustrate the 
physical strength women could possess were drawn 
equally from historical and mythological anecdotes, 
since the lines between these were blurred for their 
authors. For instance, Christine de Pizan lauds the 
strength of “[t]hose ladies from Amazonia” who “had 
already accomplished so much through their physical 
strength that every country regarded them with fear 
and apprehension” (53). Similarly, Mario Equicola 
cites the physical prowess of Getulian and Galletian 
women, who do fieldwork alongside men, and 
Bactrian women who fight in combat (10). Baldesar 
Castiglione more obliquely remarks that “there have 
always been women who have undertaken wars and 
won glorious victories” (215), and that this is known 
despite male historians often failing to adequately 
praise women. By themselves, these examples 
illustrate that women are capable of similar feats of 
strength as men, although they do not explain to an 
early modern reader why women undertaking such 
feats seem unusual or exceptional. To complete the 
argument, one must explain why women undertake 
such feats of strength less often despite being 
equally capable. 
 More sophisticated versions of these 
arguments deny that men and women differ in terms 
of physical strength as a matter of necessity. An 
author could concede that women are in fact 
physically weaker than men, but attribute this to a 
contingent feature of women’s circumstances, rather 
than any necessary difference between the sexes. 
Through reference to this contingent aspect of 
women’s situation, an author can explain why were 
all things equal, men and women would not differ in 
physical strength. In Moderata Fonte’s dialogue, The 
Worth of Women, one interlocuter contends that “if 
women do not bear arms, that isn’t because of any 
deficiency on their part, rather, the fault lies with the 
way they were brought up. Because it’s quite clear 
that those who have been trained in military 
discipline have turned out to excel in valor and skill” 
(100). In Fonte’s dialogue, a parallel is drawn 
between women’s physical and intellectual 
development. The Venetian women in the dialogue 
would have as few opportunities for intellectual 
development as physical training. Just as one would 
not expect women to excel intellectually without 
being educated (Tarabotti 97), women cannot be 
expected to excel physically without training. Any 
apparent differences between men and women are 
thus explicable not in terms of any natural physical 
difference, but instead the societal conventions 
which deny opportunities for development to women. 
Although compelling, this argument shares with the 
misogynist a presumption that the issue is 
fundamentally empirical. 
 Equicola developed a unique sceptical 
argument in recognition of the empirical nature of 
this dispute. The “naturalists” conjecture “that 
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women are cold and moist” but “what the naturalists 
affirm to us as certain amounts to nothing” because 
those studying nature intractably disagree (6). The 
question of what animals, and what parts of animals, 
are hotter or colder is described as being hotly 
contested. For instance, some theorists maintain 
that aquatic creatures are colder because of their 
environment, while others argue this is 
counterbalanced by aquatic creature’s innate 
warmth. Equicola then asks that if “hot and cold 
admit of so much uncertainty and controversy, what 
ought we to think about other sensory impressions?” 
(Ibid.). In the following paragraph he answers this by 
adding that some questions about nature are readily 
answered by sensory experience of them in normal 
life, but other “things are just plain insoluble and so 
obscure they are known only to Him.” As these 
questions are so inscrutable, Equicola concludes 
that it is foolish to use assertions about them as 
premises in one’s practical reasoning. By endorsing 
this scepticism, Equicola takes himself to be in 
continuity with a variety of methodological 
scepticism he associates with Plato (Ibid., 7). Though 
he primarily discusses the issue of heat and cold in 
this passage, Equicola does take the comparative 
strength of men and women as one of the insoluble 
questions about the natural world. To illustrate that 
this is so, he observes that “naturalists try to show 
that masculine things are larger than feminine” but 
points to the case of birds, where females are larger 
than males (Ibid., 5-6). He also remarks that some 
have argued that those with smaller, more compact 
bodies are stronger in comparison to those whose 
bodies are extended—so it is not even clear what 
constitutes strength. Given this controversy, 
grounding claims of superiority on the unclear notion 
of strength is foolish. 
 Notably, Equicola’s argument is not that 
strength is necessarily irrelevant to evaluations of 
superiority, but that we are not in an adequate 
epistemic position to know which sex would benefit 
from taking it into consideration. That is, 
considerations of strength are not dismissed on 
grounds of moral irrelevance, but on the epistemic 
grounds that they are unknowable. While this 
argument has the benefit of removing strength—and 
other bodily qualities—from consideration, the appeal 
to scepticism is only as strong as our empirical 
methodology and evidence are weak. The force of 
Equicola’s argument relies in part on the historical 
context in which it was made, wherein empirical 
methods were less precise and scepticism about 
them thus justified. The methods of natural inquiry 
remained those of Aristotle, and their 
underdeveloped state justified doubt as to whether 
they could uncover truth. The early modern period 
would see methodological advances in natural 
philosophy, culminating in the Baconian and 
Cartesian methods, but this would come after 
Equicola’s writing. If one supposes Equicola’s 
argument is that these questions are fundamentally 
unknowable, in the sense that they are forever 
insoluble and refining our methods would never put 
us in a position to know about them, it is less 
plausible. Although empirical observations cannot 
support beliefs with epistemic certainty, certainty is 
too high of standard to expect something to meet for 
use in one’s practical reasoning. The argument is 
more charitably read as making the weaker claim 
that certain questions of natural philosophy are 
insoluble using the methods of Equicola’s 
“naturalists.” This argument can only suspend our 
judgement on the question by calling into doubt the 
veracity of the available methods, but it does not 
ultimately deny that the question is empirical. The 
tactic of delaying can only be justified so long as 
one’s epistemic position remains poor, and thus 
cannot be maintained indefinitely as empirical 
methodologies improved throughout the history of 
science. 
 A final argument to consider here is that of 
Balesar Castiglione in his Book of the Courtier. There 
he presents as a dialogue a fictional courtly debate 
over the worth of women. The character of Magnifico 
Giuliano remarks that accidental qualities adhere to 
either one’s mind or body (214). He then considers 
the argument that men are superior to women 
because of their bodily qualities, stating that “man 
being more robust, more quick and agile, and more 
able to endure toil, I say this little argues perfection” 
(Ibid.). The argument from superior bodily qualities 
fails because among men there are significant 
variances in the amount of strength possessed, and 
those who have more strength are not thought to be 
better in virtue of their strength, even in times of war 
where strength would presumably be most valued. 
To support his claim that any differences in strength 
between men and women are insignificant, Giuliano 
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points to ancient and modern history, wherein “there 
have always been women who have undertaken 
wars and won glorious victories” and “[a]s for 
manual works, it would be too long to tell of them” 
(Ibid., 215). Hence, differences in accidental 
qualities may be understood at an individual level 
instead of generalized to the sex. The upshot is that 
men are not superior to women with regard to 
accidental qualities, including physical strength. 
 Nevertheless, the argument in this passage 
presents some interpretive difficulties. Giuliano 
makes certain essentialist claims about women. For 
instance, he argues that those weaker in body tend 
to be mentally stronger, and on this basis argues 
“that women, being weaker in body, are abler in 
mind” (Ibid., 214). Similarly, Giuliano echoes the 
Aristotelian position found in the Economics in 
stating that nature created women adapted to a 
necessary end of raising children, and “although 
[nature] makes [women] unsturdy of body and gives 
them a placid spirit and many other qualities 
opposed to men” the qualities of women are 
complementary to those of men (Ibid., 215). 
Squaring these statements with his argument that 
variances in accidental qualities between men and 
women are insignificant is not easy. One explanation 
is that, as a literary depiction of a courtly debate, the 
character of Giuliano is using every argument at his 
disposal, regardless of how well they connect, as one 
might in an actual, verbal debate. Alternatively, a 
charitable reading would be that there are 
differences in men and women’s constitutions, but 
not to such an extent that it prevents one or the 
other sex from being able to excel physically or 
mentally. Women’s bodies might be such that they 
are disadvantaged in physical training, but not so 
much that they cannot overtake the average man. 
 The argument in the Book of the Courtier 
provides a segue between arguments which deny the 
sexes differ with respect to strength, and those that 
deny that strength is morally relevant to evaluations 
of their respective worth. Castiglione’s argument 
approaches denial of the relevance of strength, in 
that he draws a distinction between strength and 
intellect, concluding that intellect is more important, 
and that women are superior in intellect (214). 
However, the conclusion is that the strength of men 
and women do not differ enough to tip the scales of 
the comparison. It is not that strength is irrelevant, 
but that it does not favour either men or women 
when considered. As we will see momentarily, 
Bartolomeo Goggio makes a similar argument while 
arriving at the conclusion that physical strength is 
not morally relevant to the question of the worth of 
the sexes. The distinction might seem slight, but its 
significance lies in how the arguments against 
difference base their claims on the empirical 
question of relative strength, while arguments 
against relevance undercut this issue by trying to 
demonstrate that any differences in strength that 
exist do not matter. 
 
4. Arguments Against Relevance 
 
A compelling example of an argument that physical 
strength is irrelevant to evaluations of superiority is found 
in Bartolomeo Goggio’s In Praise of Women. Goggio 
considers the argument that “man is stronger of body and 
mind, and for this reason the [man] is superior to the 
[woman]” but counters that “one may easily respond that 
strength is worth little against intellect. And the latter is 
more acute in women than in men” (8). He denies that 
strength is a relevant consideration when assessing 
superiority, and also indicates that while intellect is a 
relevant quality to consider, critics of women mistakenly 
attribute to them less intelligence. This argument therefore 
draws an explicit contrast between strength and intellect as 
qualities relevant to evaluations of worth, with strength 
being discounted. Goggio anticipates an argument Thomas 
Hobbes would provide almost two-hundred years later in 
Leviathan. There Hobbes argued that people in the pre-
societal state of nature are basically equal in terms of their 
comparative strength because any imbalance in strength is 
easily overcome by “secret machination, or by confederacy 
with others” (99). This conclusion, with respect to women, 
is the same as Goggio’s. Whatever differences in physical 
strength might exist between men and women, they are too 
meagre to entail anything once intellect is considered. 
 The comparison with Hobbes draws out further 
important features of Goggio’s arguments. Like Goggio, 
Hobbes’ argument is meant to demonstrate that individual 
strength is irrelevant, but what exactly it is irrelevant to 
differs according to Hobbes’ meta-ethical commitments. 
Hobbes is committed in Leviathan to an expressivist 
perspective on morality; the terms “good” and “bad” do not 
indicate for Hobbes claims of objective moral truth, but are 
expressions of preferences (44). This expressivist account 
of morality is a crucial step in Hobbes’ project in Leviathan 
because it undercuts any objections to his social contract 
theory an opponent could launch on the basis of 
considering independent moral principles. Since there are 
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only considerations of power, the social contract cannot be 
externally criticized as not according with some moral 
principle, because those moral principles are just disguised 
expressions of preference. This meta-ethical anti-realism 
which underwrites Hobbes’ social contract theory is, of 
course, absent in Goggio. Throughout In Praise of Women, 
Goggio describes the moral relevance of different qualities 
people possess in terms of their relation to one’s “nobility” 
(6). What precisely nobility consists in is unarticulated in 
Goggio, however “nobility” seems to generally refer to the 
culminative moral worth of a person or people. Goggio is 
then committed to a kind of moral realism wherein there 
are certain criteria relevant to normative evaluations of 
people, and those who score well on those criteria are more 
noble. Since strength is not among the class of things that 
can increase or decrease one’s nobility, it is irrelevant to 
assessments of the comparative worth of individuals, or to 
the comparative worth of the sexes. 
 Goggio goes on to argue for the moral irrelevance 
of physical strength by pointing to how it is not commonly 
taken to be determinate of superiority in other contexts. He 
states that “if, as it is said that physical strength makes a 
person more noble, then undoubtably porters, who carry 
such heavy loads, would be nobler than any other 
gentleman of lesser strength, and this is false” (8). In this 
argument, Goggio notes that the relative physical strength 
of those being evaluated is normally taken to be irrelevant 
to one’s “nobility.” That is, Goggio appeals to the usual, 
implicit assumptions people have about what is relevant to 
moral evaluation to make the case that strength is not 
relevant to such evaluations. This distinguishes Goggio’s 
argument from Castiglione’s, which held that the 
differences in strength are too minor to count in either sex’s 
favour, though they could were they not so meagre. Instead, 
Goggio appeals to the intuition that strength is simply not 
the kind of thing which is relevant to normative evaluations 
of people’s character by appealing to how this view is 
purportedly evident in the existing social hierarchies. 
Although this conception of moral relevance is implicit in 
Goggio, it is more explicitly expressed in the work of 
François Poulain de la Barre. 
 Poulain de la Barre begins with the observation 
that many beliefs which people possess are unjustified 
prejudices that they believe on the basis of the prevailing 
customs around them (122). This “false concept of a 
custom” leads people to draw an incorrect inference: “if 
some practice is well established, then we think it must be 
right” (Ibid. 125). As everyone acknowledges that people 
should never act contrary to reason, they assume that the 
practices they encounter in everyday life must have been 
established according to reason. However, upon reflecting 
on human affairs, one finds that “reason has always been 
the weakest factor” in deciding societal customs (127). 
Instead, the factor which most determines the customs and 
organization of a society is force, and the history of every 
society testifies to this reality. Whereas Goggio anticipated 
Hobbes’ argument about the relative strength of individuals 
in the state of nature, Poulain is likely to have been 
influenced by Hobbes’ views about the artificial nature of 
political power (Stuurman 177). Poulain explains the 
existing dominance of men over women by referring to the 
arbitrary role power has played in the development of 
society—and the starting point of his analysis is men’s 
superior physical strength.  
 By establishing force as that which determines 
social customs, Poulain laid the groundwork for his 
speculative anthropology of women’s domination. This 
“historical conjecture” begins with the claim that “[w]hen 
men realized they were stronger and that they were 
physically superior to women, they imagined they were 
superior in every other respect” (127). In the early, pre-
societal state of nature, this invalid inference had limited 
consequences, and both sexes participated equally in 
hunting and agriculture. However, the “interruption of 
pregnancy and its after-effects reduced the strength of 
women for periods of time” which led to a voluntary 
dependency of women on men within the family (Ibid., 
128). This dependence informed the division of labour 
within the family; women were assigned domestic duties, 
while men used their strength to work outside of the home. 
At this historical juncture, Poulain speculates, some young 
men in the family would not submit to the authority of their 
elder male relatives. When forced to leave, these young 
men would form new clans, and would gain property for 
themselves by stealing goods and enslaving the goods’ 
owners. The women in these captured clans would thereby 
transition from the voluntary dependence of the state of 
nature to the involuntary subjugation of a society where 
they are property of their husbands. Certain men 
“encouraged by the success of their victory, decided to 
extend their conquests” raising armies made up of men 
“chosen as suitable for enterprises that required more 
strength” (128-129). These conquests consolidated 
societies in which the laws were made exclusively by the 
conquering men, and the custom of women being limited 
to domestic work was enshrined in the law. Thereby custom 
became the basis of excluding women from occupations, 
religious ministry, and sciences. 
 Although the assumption that men possess 
greater physical strength is the starting point of his 
speculative anthropology, Poulain appears to contradict 
this assumption later in the same work. In the second part 
of A Physical and Moral Discourse, he gives arguments that 
appear to deny any difference in strength, instead of 
arguments denying strength is morally relevant. Like 
Castiglione, Poulain notes that there “are strong and weak 
people of both sexes” (184). The explanation of this is to be 
found in how much one exercises—since women are not 
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encouraged or in some cases even permitted to exercise as 
much as men, they unsurprisingly are less physically 
strong. As we earlier saw in Fonte, this line of argument has 
been used to deny that there are significant differences in 
strength between the sexes. However, this presents an 
apparent problem for Poulain’s speculative anthropology, 
since it takes as its starting point the superior strength of 
men to explain the arbitrary nature of men’s suppression of 
women. If there are no significant differences in strength 
between men and women, one cannot appeal to men’s 
superior strength as part of one’s explanation of how they 
came to dominate. The solution to this conundrum is to 
conceive of exercise as closing a gap in bodily strength that 
initially exists between men and women. Poulain implies 
this in stating that his argument “suggest[s] that if both 
sexes exercised to the same extent, one could possibly 
become as strong as the other” (184; emphasis mine). This 
solution permits Poulain to assert both that men have a 
natural advantage in physical strength, which facilitates his 
speculative anthropology, and that this natural advantage 
evaporates at higher levels of physical exercise. Poulain’s 
position is in fact supported by empirical research, which 
finds that differences in strength between athletically 
trained men and women are less pronounced then those in 
the general population (Gater et al, 44). 
 Underpinning the historical conjecture is a 
supposition that strength is not morally relevant, hence the 
domination of men over women does not accord with 
reason. To appreciate this, contrast Poulain’s speculative 
anthropology with that of pseudo-Aristotle in the 
Economics. In both works the greater physical strength of 
men is credited as the origin of the division of labour in the 
family. However, pseudo-Aristotle does not distinguish 
between the descriptive is of how the division of labour 
came about, and the normative ought of whether women’s 
domination by men is justified. The Aristotelian work 
surmises from its speculative anthropology that the 
dominance of men over women is natural, and therefore 
morally justified. However, as David Hume famously 
argued, one cannot derive a moral conclusion from a 
descriptive account without introducing a moral premise 
(335). Poulain anticipates this distinction by recognizing 
that one cannot conclude on the basis of a speculative 
anthropology of the kind he provides that women’s 
subjugation is morally justified, unless one accepts the 
premise that might makes right. Since Poulain explicitly 
rejects this premise (153), his historical conjecture reveals 
that the domination of men over women rests on an 
arbitrary foundation when assessed ethically. Echoing 
Goggio (6), Poulain observes that were strength the 
deciding factor of one’s worth “brute animals would be 
superior to humans” and that philosophers, princes, and 
generals would be inferior to men suited to nothing but 
hard labour (185). The customs that disenfranchise women 
are thus arbitrary, as their foundation is a distinction based 
on strength. Hence Poulain concludes that the customs 
should be abolished and women’s equality recognized. 
 In a similar vein to Poulain, Arcangela Tarabotti 
had earlier denied that strength is morally relevant while 
using men’s physical strength to explain features of their 
dominance over women. In Paternal Tyranny, Tarabotti 
assures the reader that she cannot “pass over in silence 
men’s folly when they extol their strength to Heaven and 
cast our own ‘weakness’ into the deepest abyss” (47). She 
rejects the physical strength exhibited by men as being 
relevant to evaluations of worth since it is not even “true 
strength,” which “lies in conquering one’s passions” (Ibid.). 
An explicit contrast is drawn between these two qualities 
with one being singled out as morally relevant and the other 
rejected. This evokes Plato’s conception of the soul, 
wherein justice consists in reason ruling over the appetitive 
and spirited parts of the soul (Plato 305). To use 
Castiglione’s distinction between the two possible kinds of 
accidental qualities, those of the mind and the body (214), 
Tarabotti is identifying ‘true’ strength with an accidental 
quality of the mind while rejecting its identification with 
accidental qualities of the body. By shifting the terms of the 
debate from physical strength to mental fortitude, Tarabotti 
lays the groundwork for her argument that women are 
superior. Unlike men, women are “forever virtuous, 
resistant to every push and pull of ill-conceived thoughts 
and desires” but men are “nothing but inconstant” (47-48). 
Her denial of physical strength’s relevance enables 
Tarabotti to argue that on the appropriate criteria for 
evaluation, women outperform men. 
 In fairness, Tarabotti states that women in fact do 
outclass men in physical strength, despite her assertion 
that “true” strength consists in mental rather than physical 
fortitude. She claims that “everybody knows how much 
stronger women are in conceiving and bearing children, 
which they carry for nine months without tiring” (47). This 
claim is seemingly at odds with her firm distinction between 
physical strength and the “true” strength of conquering 
one’s passions, in which women excel. In this case, 
Tarabotti likely values consistency less than forcefully 
arguing for women’s superiority. Nevertheless, there is 
nothing inconsistent in her asserting that physical strength 
is morally irrelevant yet, for the record, women outclass 
men in terms of physical strength anyway.  
 The physical strength of men and superior mental 
fortitude of women are used in Tarabotti to explain the 
subjugation of women. Men’s physical strength leads them 
to think that “evil is good and good is evil” in that they glorify 
killing in war, and believe taking violent revenge for an 
insult displays more strength than bearing it without 
retaliating (Tarabotti 47). Women’s greater mental and 
emotional fortitude helps them to avoid these vices as it 
prevents them from falling prey to the desires which incline 
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men to war and violence. Men’s inconstancy is used later 
in Paternal Tyranny to explain men’s subjugation of women, 
particularly in the case of their forcibly confining women to 
convents. Tarabotti states that “men glory ostentatiously in 
such misdeeds with the same pride [they] dared display up 
to the Golden Age, full of ambition, treachery, and bestial 
idolatry” (68). This includes fathers taking pride in the 
forced confinement of their daughters for the purposes of 
improving their status or reducing their financial burdens. 
Since men are less capable of exhibiting true strength and 
resisting desires which would incline them to evil, they 
unjustly suppress women. Tarabotti’s assertion 
that the morally relevant qualities are those of mind rather 
than bodies reflects a common distinction in the querelle. 
Arguments denying difference or denying relevance are 
often a prelude to arguments that women are equal or 
superior to men on the basis of qualities of mind. For 
instance, both Augustino Strozza (14) and Marie de 
Gournay (65) note that the distinct attribute of human 
beings is a rational soul, which both sexes possess equally. 
Arguments against difference, and those against 
relevance, differ in that the latter make attributes of the 
rational soul the exclusive basis of normative evaluations 
of people, while the former maintains that they are one kind 
of consideration to be weighed against others, but strength 




The foregoing analysis of the querelle des femmes 
identified two argumentative strategies used by 
advocates for women in the debate who addressed 
the issue of the sexes’ relative strength. The first, 
represented here by Pizan, Fonte, Equicola, and 
Castiglione, denies that any significant differences 
exist between men and women’s physical strength. 
The second, illustrated through the examples of 
Goggio, Poulain, and Tarabotti, contends that any 
differences in physical strength that exist between 
men and women are irrelevant to ethical evaluations 
of the sexes’ respective worth. The second of these 
arguments rejects physical strength as an appropriate 
criterion of assessment, while the first maintains that 
it is, but denies that consideration of it favours one or 
the other sex. However, neither argument takes 
physical strength to be the exclusive criterion on 
which to base assessments of the sexes’ relative 
worth—even the first argument which accepts 
strength as a valid criterion. Instead, defenders of 
women in the querelle almost universally point to 
mental attributes as either carrying more weight, or 
being the exclusive criterion in an assessment of 
relative worth. Naturally, those who deny differences 
in strength between men and women are those who 
believe mental attributes merely carry more weight, 
while those who reject physical strength believe that 
mental attributes are the exclusive criterion. Both 
arguments are then often a precursor to shifting the 
focus of the debate from physical to mental attributes, 
though the denial of relevance does this more 
successfully. By leaving physical strength open as a 
valid criterion of assessment, arguments that deny 
difference must weigh considerations of strength 
against all others when assessing worth. 
 The chief advantage of the denial of relevance 
as an argumentative strategy over the denial of 
difference is that the question of how physical 
strength bears on the comparative worth of the sexes 
is settled. If an argument that physical strength is 
irrelevant is successful, no amount of new empirical 
evidence that one sex is stronger than the other can 
upset the established conclusion that this empirical 
fact does not matter. Conversely, relying on the denial 
of differences in strength to argue the equality of the 
sexes holds the issue hostage to an empirical 
question that remains to be decided. Recall 
Equicola’s sceptical argument, which held that the 
empirical methods available in his day could not 
justify drawing conclusions about relative strength of 
the sexes (6). At best, one can argue on this basis that 
the jury remains out and one should suspend 
judgment on the question. However, as empirical 
methodologies are refined it becomes increasingly 
difficult to epistemically justify the suspension of 
judgment. The trouble with the denial of difference is 
that it leaves open this possibility that by conceding 
the relevance of strength to the question of worth, the 
advocate for women might be backed into a corner 
when new empirical information on the issue 
becomes available. Those relying on the denial of 
differences must always be on their guard against 
new evidence, and prepared to explain it away should 
it arise. The defender of women who denies the 
relevance of physical strength does not share this 
argumentative obligation, and can reject strength out 
of hand as not bearing on the question of whether one 
sex is superior to the other. 
 The second advantage of denying the 
relevance of strength is that an author is then able to 
concede that men possess more physical strength 
and put this concession to use argumentatively. 
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Robbed of its normative importance, men’s strength 
can be used to explain how they asserted their 
dominance over women, or even as the basis for an 
argument that women are the superior sex. For 
Poulain, differences in men and women’s relative 
strength are used in his speculative anthropology to 
account for how the social hierarchy which 
subordinates women to men was formed (127). The 
customary exclusion of women from various 
occupations, religious ministry, and the sciences, are 
explicable through a purely descriptive account of 
power relations that take as their starting point 
natural differences in physical strength. Only by 
denying that physical strength has any normative 
import can Poulain have it do all this explanatory work 
in his speculative anthropology. Similarly, Tarabotti 
gets some argumentative mileage out of men’s 
physical strength after denying its moral relevance. 
She maintains that in possessing greater physical 
strength men are tempted by the vices of war and 
violence, while women are not similarly led astray 
(47). As in Poulain, men’s physical strength is here 
used to partly explain why they have suppressed 
women, though here the account refers not to the 
division of labour in the state of nature, but the 
inclination of men to certain vices. In addition to doing 
this explanatory work, Tarabotti argues that the 
violent vices men are inclined toward by their strength 
make them inferior in virtue to women. Conceding 
men’s greater physical strength thus opens up 
avenues both to give a descriptive explanation of how 
men came to dominate, and to ground an argument 
that women are superior to men in morally relevant 
areas.  
As an argumentative strategy, the denial of relevance 
therefore makes available to a writer resources that 
the denial of difference cannot, for the purposes of 
explaining women’s subjugation or even arguing that 
women are superior to men. When coupled with how 
the denial of relevance precludes the possibility of 
future empirical interventions upsetting calculations 
of relative worth between the sexes, it emerges as the 
more powerful argumentative strategy of the two 
commonly utilized in the querelle to contest the claim 
that men’s physical strength makes them superior. 
The arguments denying the relevance of physical 
strength retain their force even today, when improved 
empirical research favours the view that there exist 
natural differences in physical strength between men 
and women, albeit ones that are less pronounced at 
higher levels of fitness (Gater et al. 44). The existence 
of this difference in physical strength is unlikely to 
persuade a contemporary reader that men are 
“superior” to women, in no small part because most 
people are implicitly committed now, as Poulain was, 
to the view that “sheer physical strength should not 
be used to distinguish between human beings” (185). 
The denial of difference thus has the approval of 
posterity, in that no normative theory takes physical 
strength as an appropriate basis for moral 
evaluations of worth. 
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